Financial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions. Basel II forces signatory countries to reopen safety-net bargaining across affected sectors. This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to interpret the Basel Accords as a framework for endlessly renegotiating minimal 
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BASEL II: A CONTRACTING PERSPECTIVE * This paper uses the concepts of regulatory arbitrage, sequential decision-making, and incomplete contracting to explain why Basel II has so many loose ends and why U.S. efforts to implement Basel II have been roiled by controversy and delays. Perceived as a forum for reregulation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) enlists central banks and supervisory authorities ("regulators") from financial-center countries to work together to control regulatory arbitrage and to promote financial integration and better risk management (Barr and Miller, 2006; Pattison, 2006) . But the success of BCBS negotiations is limited by the largely nonbinding nature of the agreements its members ratify and by divergences in the interests and political clout of the economic sectors BCBS conferees represent.
For this reason, the original 1988 BCBS Accord (Basel I) and its successor Accord (Basel II) are better viewed as a collection of strategic guidelines than as systems of rules. The agreements neither spell out explicitly the quasi-fiduciary duties that banking regulators owe to their counterparts in other countries nor explain how such duties are to be enforced when they conflict with the interests of stakeholders to whom they are politically accountable. The Accord fails to include clauses that could make regulators in individual countries directly accountable to one another for breaching the standards the BCBS promulgates.
Additional weaknesses exist both in the methods used to test Basel II arrangements for their effects on the cross-country and within-country distributions of financial-institution risk and regulatory capital and in the methods that were originally used to set the 4-percent and 8-percent capital standards.
Section I views the contracting process as unfolding in three phases and underscores the nontransparency of pre-Basel and post-Basel dealmaking between governmental and industry stakeholders in individual countries (on the one hand) and the negotiating teams that participated directly in the Basel contracting process (on the other). To minimize contracting costs, it is optimal prior to letting agents undertake cross-country negotiations for interested economic sectors in each country --as principals--to exchange understandings with their particular negotiating team. Each understanding is meant to constrain the concessions that the particular sector may be asked to absorb. Because inconsistencies in sectoral understandings are unavoidable, individual-country negotiators must insist that cross-country agreements incorporate design options (called "national adaptions and concretions" by Kette, 2006 ) that leave contract terms incomplete. National regulators need these options to placate principals that might feel short-changed (or even betrayed) by the international agreement. The hope was that these options could be easily employed to craft subdeals that would be mutually acceptable to competing interests in their home counties. However, to the extent that preBasel understandings made logically inconsistent promises to different U.S. constituencies, the discounted value of contracting costs was not minimized. That disappointed parties were bound to regard themselves as shortchanged helps to explain the gaps in regulatory accountability the Accord accommodates and the protracted and sometimes waspish nature of post-Basel negotiations.
Section II describes the major options conveyed to banks and regulators by the Basel II agreement. Although negotiators prefer not to acknowledge this, adherence to cross-country guidelines will be tempered by the force of contrary domestic pressures and by the severity of financial troubles that different economies experience. Government responses to political and crisis pressures in the past indicate that clientele, career, and bureaucratic interests tend to outweigh international considerations. In tough times, whatever concern individual regulators might have for preserving or enhancing their standing within the international regulatory community (emphasized, e.g., in Whitehead, 2006) will not matter very much.
Section III proposes a simplified nonmathematical model that can explain how inconsistencies in the goals and predeal understandings of interested domestic sectors have prolonged post-Basel bargaining in the United States. Section IV identifies some possible paths for resolving contradictory concerns. If delays and other contracting costs are to be minimized, the path of least resistance would be for regulators to focus on "competitive equality" and to abandon efforts to link reductions in regulatory capital to the extent to which an institution actually improves its risk management.
I. Viewing the Basel Accord as an Incomplete Multilevel Contract
The fairness and efficiency of the explicit terms of the contract (or "deal") constructed in Basel fall short of the Basel Committee's stated goals of eliminating perceived crosscountry competitive inequalities by promoting comprehensive risk management and consistency in international regulatory standards. However, just as our view of a forest might be blocked by its trees, the redeeming social value of Basel negotiations as a multilevel and intertemporal strategy-making process can be obscured by focusing only on difficulties observed in particular outcomes.
Marking off particular sequences of negotiations and assigning them a discrete numeral misses the essential continuity and inconclusiveness of the patch-by-patch contracting process. This paper conceives of negotiation outcomes at any date T as "Basel (T)": the value of an integral equation whose kernel "B(t)dt" is driven by the goals that stakeholders (S ik ) in each of m different countries(k = 1, …, m) hope to achieve and the resources (R ik ) they plan to invest in lobbying for these goals. Figure 1 identifies the so-called "pillars" of the Basel II Accord. Although the diagram depicts the pillars to be of equal height and thickness, especially with respect to risks (such as interest-rate risk in the banking book) that are not part of Pillar 1, the second and third pillars have been hollowed out by lobbying efforts and globally may not support much weight. Until and unless the incentives of individual-country banks and regulators are better aligned with those of world citizens, Pillar 2 options may be too feeble, too opaque, and too riddled with conflict from regulatory competition to provide reliable reinforcement for the other pillars.
It is important to recognize that Basel II asks rather than forces national regulators to behave in globally appropriate ways. Realistically, it frames a renegotiation game that binds officials only to monitor and to think about the global consequences of actions taken by the institutions they regulate. The outcome of this game is apt to prove more favorable for some countries than for others.
As mutable multinational agreements, the contracts the BCBS writes establish an intertemporal structure within which to renegotiate complicated multiparty relationships.
They are not treaties because signatories represent regulatory agencies rather than sovereign governments. Individual negotiators and the people they report to are short-lived agents for numerous long-lived principals. The principals are constituencies that are modelled here as concerned sectors of each agent's home economy. Each tentative contract that agents consider in Basel promises to pass a series of rights and obligations through to the negotiators' home constituencies.
Within a country's government, financial regulators are expected simultaneously to supervise and to represent conflicting constituencies. Contracting theory presupposes that costs of reading and writing contracts are minimized. To minimize the total costs of negotiating with foreign and domestic constituencies, Basel II negotiations proceed in three phases. Prior to conducting dealmaking sessions in Basel, each negotiator must prenegotiate hard and soft constraints on its ability to accept deals that might disadvantage its politically powerful domestic principals. It is useful to think of these restrictions as predeal understandings. An understanding is neither as sharply worded nor as enforceable as a formal contract. To the extent that understandings are not made public, particular constituencies can interpret their understandings in ways that might well be inconsistent with understandings furnished to one or more other sectors. Moreover, as parties with a personal and organizational interest in the game, negotiators may believe it is advantageous to accept soft constraints on key issues that they plan subsequently to violate.
Most twists and turns in the terms of Basel II promised to reallocate the costs and benefits generated by individual-country safety nets. Hence, each time negotiators in Basel materially revised cross-country guidelines to meet objections raised by agents for particular constituencies, negotiators returning from Basel have to describe the changes to their national constituencies and reconcile them with prior understandings. Third-phase recontracting occurs separately with other concerned officials within a given government and with interested sectoral constituencies. In this phase, negotiators are apt to paint their need to renege on predeal agreements as if they were necessitated by what they learned in Basel about the constraints faced or imposed by foreign negotiators.
Within countries, individual financial institutions hoped that Basel II would redistribute safety-net costs and benefits among competing governmental and sectoral interests in advantageous ways. For U.S. regulators, the stated purpose of the negotiations was to enhance financial stability and improve risk management. As the negotiations wore on, negotiators from the European Union seemed more interested in using Basel II to promote regulatory integration. The European Parliament apparently wanted to establish a uniform framework for internationally active European banking groups without burdening regional banks operating mainly in national markets.
Like bodily health, stability cannot be traded from one party to another. It is what Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) characterize as an "undescribable" variable. Negotiators assume stability can be proxied and that the proxy can be defined as the absence of worrisome forms of financial disorder. More concretely, Basel II presupposes that changes in stability can be represented by obverse movements in the probability and loss severity of the particular disorders (such as economic insolvencies and operational breakdowns) that adjustments in the Accord seek to hold at bay. Implicitly, every draft of the second Basel Accord embodied a projection of how selected control variables (especially variously defined capital ratios) affect the components of a larger-dimensional space of global welfare. The implicit projection that Basel II will reduce individual-bank or systemic risks is largely hypothetical. Empirical support consists mainly of qualitative inferences about how widely recognized forms of risk-taking, risk transfer, and risk support undertaken by individual financial institutions or their regulators ought in theory to affect a subset of default probabilities and loss severities in question.
Incompleteness
In a world of changing governments, it is impossible for one generation of regulators to craft a contract that can firmly precommit their successors. In a world of changing financial technology, the list of contractable triggers of instability can never be completely described.
For both reasons, explicit contractual rights and duties must have slack built into them. In principle, the loose ends are intended to allow individual-country regulators enough flexibility to expand their catalogue of approved and disapproved behaviors over time as unforseeable circumstances dictate. In practice, loose ends are reciprocal options that allow safety-net subsidies to be distributed nontransparently to private financial interests.
From this practical point of view, the most disturbing loose ends concern Basel II's treatment of large and complex banking organizations. Regulators need the vision to see through the accounting numbers to the true condition of the institutions they supervise and the incentives to respond appropriately to what they see. A bank's opacity, political clout, and organizational ability to arbitrage regulatory systems increase both with its size and with its complexity. Even within countries, clever rogues or desperate managers can book particular loss exposures in ways that are too opaque for regulators to monitor and discipline them effectively. It is possible that data-collection and risk-measurement standards under Basel II are so loosely specified that close adherence to them in making business decisions can support an increase rather than a decrease in insolvency risk at many banks. To lessen this danger, capital requirements under Basel II ought to incorporate a measure of opacity and impose an additional opacity-related capital requirement to account for the opportunities that large and complex banks have to relocate exposures across instruments and borders to avoid detection and/or to lessen their exposure to Pillar 2 discipline.
A good contract is easy to understand and creates incentives for its fulfillment. From the perspective of the individual constituencies, hard-to-decode loose ends are options that can be characterized as opportunities for regulators to renegotiate or reinterpret the agreement when unforeseen or unspecified contingencies arise (Ben-Shahar, 2004; Foss, 1996; Hart and Moore, 2007) . Retaining flexibility is a good thing, but granting flexibility to a contractual counterparty authorizes it to act adversely to one's interests. No matter how well-intentioned, any contract as complex as Basel II must be feared (Rasmussen, 1996) . The remedies for this fear are trust and independent analytic ability, but neither of these remedies is costless for an individual agent or stakeholder to establish.
An agent builds trust by making itself accountable for results. An agent builds accountability (A) in three ways: by making its actions and motives transparent, by bonding its commitment to the principal's interests, and by giving the principal the power to deter opportunistic behavior. Bonus clauses and reputational costs are forms of bonding. An opportunistic agent's exposure to retribution from the principal has a deterrent effect.
For every stakeholder (S j , j = 1, …, n), the value of each imbedded option k (O jk , k = 1, …, m j ) depends on the degree to which stakeholder j can reasonably trust the option's counterparties to behave competently and nonopportunistically. At Basel, agents failed to bond the Pillar II activities of foreign regulators to the goal of financial stability or to negotiate the kinds of inter-regulator and public disclosures that would reliably buttress market discipline by allowing independent experts to assess the quality of Pillar II activity. U.S. negotiating teams are not personally accountable to voter-taxpayers for these omissions. Members were allowed to renegotiate Basel I without direct Congressional involvement or approval. What accountability exists comes nontransparently from post-Basel negotiations with other U.S. regulators and industry groups. Ironically, these groups' ability to win new concessions traces to their option to lobby Congressional committees to weigh in on their side.
As post-Basel dealmaking evolves, the net value of an uninvolved sector j's collection of implicit options are unlikely to be fully counterbalanced by the value of the net benefits or burdens conveyed by the explicit and enforceable terms of the contract (B
This is because involved sectors that see the deal as exposing them to harm have a strong incentive to hold up --or even to blow up--the deal.
II. Options Conveyed to Banks and Regulators by Basel II
Financial safety nets are social contracts between governments and their citizens.
Prudential regulation of financial institutions seeks to balance the social costs and benefits of a country's safety net. Both Basel Accords recognize the possibility that the cross-country operations of aggressive multinational banks or opportunistic interventions by their regulators can upset this balance.
Government intervention in finance leads to a protracted series of collisions between political and economic forces (Kane, 1981 and 1984) . Basel II represents the third stage in a dialectical sequence of regulation, burden avoidance, and eventual re-regulation. The patterns of the regulatory arbitrage and response that Basel I induced are unusual in three ways. First, almost all banks have chosen to hold capital positions that are greatly in excess of minimum standards and hope to continue to advertise themselves that way. Second, any bank that found the minimum standards burdensome could almost costlessly close the gap by securitizing lowrisk loans and thereby increase its portfolio risk to raise its desired level of capital to the regulatory minimum. Third, around the world, banks and regulators support the effort to narrow this loophole by increasing the granularity of the risk categories used in setting capital standards.
Besides increasing the number of risk categories, Basel II proposes to use a mix of that it incorporates a wider range of weights and asks countries to choose a set of external rating agencies and use these agencies' assessments of risk to determine country-level capital requirements. IRB Approaches allow banks to specify and submit for validation their own "internal" models to calibrate their exposure to insolvency risk. Basel II distinguishes the socalled Foundation IRB (FIRB) model from the Advanced IRB (AIRB) model for constructing these estimates and calculating minimum capital requirements. For each individual credit, both models require banks to specify a probability of default (PD), a "loss given default" (LGD), and an expected exposure at default (EAD). The FIRB approach differs from the AIRB in specifying rules for calculating EAD and in using a single LGD for all of a bank's credits. In calculating EAD, FIRB ignores the possibility that the rate of credit-line drawdown and borrower PD are likely to be driven by common factors (Kupiec, 2007) .
The internally generated data are plugged into a correlation function based on characteristics of each credit and then passed through a model that ultimately produces a probability distribution of potential losses over the next year. Minimum regulatory capital is determined by the requirement that the bank must be able to absorb all but the last 0.1 percent tail of losses displayed by this synthetic distribution. How artfully a bank parametizes this distribution is difficult to constrain. Because capital is costly, savvy regulators expect that most banks will use legitimate reporting options to understate their true loss exposure to some degree. Ideally, regulatory protocols for validating models under the AIRB ought to focus on estimating how fast the uncovered tail of the true loss distribution might grow when and as adverse circumstances cause a bank's economic capital to decline (Kane, 2006) .
III. A Non-Mathematical Model of Post-Basel Contracting in the United States
It is convenient to define I j as the information and expertise needed to evaluate accurately the option values O j and net contractual benefit or burden B j stakeholder j faces from a proposed deal. Gaps can exist between I j and the information and expertise I j that constituency j or its agent a j actually possesses. When these gaps are not fully appreciated by a constituency or its agent(s), it is unlikely that its interests will be adequately safeguarded.
Rationally, constituencies that simultaneously do not trust their agents to represent their interests energetically and have enough information to perceive adverse movements in their stake in the Accord should exert pressure to prolong the deal-making until one or the other condition can be repaired.
To understand post-Basel developments in the U.S., it is helpful to construct a model.
My model supposes that in each participating country (q = 1,…, Q), national regulators are agents whose respective objective functions W q combines welfare from four sources:
1. Personal rewards to particular leaders (p q ); Tables 1 and 2 model the Accord's main stakeholders in the U.S. and Europe, respectively. Table 3 models their objective functions and the conflicts in the goals they are assumed to have pursued. To apply the model, it is assumed that the first-order missions of US and European Union (EU) negotiators differed substantially. US negotiators sought principally to enhance financial stability and reward banks that improved their riskmanagement systems, while EU representatives sought primarily to promote uniformity in supervisory protocols in the hopes of lessening home-host differences in the regulatory burdens imposed on multinational banks headquartered in the EU.
For modeling purposes, it is convenient to assume that the changing set of Fed leaders listed in table 1 negotiated the U.S. position in Basel, but that the Fed must now negotiate implementation issues with the current leaders of other U.S. financial regulators taken as a group. None of these leaders held office during the pre-Basel negotiation stage. I call the collective group the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Plus (FDIC+) because I assume that at the outset of post-Basel dealmaking, these regulators' twofold concern in post-Basel negotiations was to defend the interests of their particular regulatory clienteles and to protect the deposit-insurance fund against the possibility that large banks might be able to operate in a low capital position. I also assume that Congress and the Administration projected that, over their expected terms in office, voter-taxpayers were prepared to let financial-institution regulators slug it out until and unless either they created a public controversy or systemic financial problems emerged. If the first event occurred (and it did), elected politicians planed to jump in and help to sort things out.
To maintain their capacity for shifting blame, politicians had to accept any system on which the Fed and the FDIC+ could agree, but regulators and industry clienteles were free to persuade politicians and voters to examine and defend their stakes in the outcome if negotiations were to proceed badly enough for their side.
1 Finally, I assume that, because of its less-elitist clientele and minimal contact with foreign regulators, the bureaucratic costs of exercising this or other hold-up threats is much less for members of the FDIC+ than for the Fed.
Incentive Conflicts in Post-Basel Negotiations
Conflicts between the social missions of regulators and the interests of the sectors they regulate cannot be avoided. Post-Basel negotiations must resolve not only these conflicts, but also conflicts among the missions and clienteles assigned to different regulators.
The interests of the nation's largest institutions in inter-regulator negotiations are also conflicted. On the one hand, standards that would be tough enough to assure financial stability would help large banks by lessening the expected value of the FDIC's right to levy ex post assessments to finance losses that exceed the value of the FDIC's insurance fund. On the other hand, they want to compete as strongly as possible with foreign institutions. In every financial-center country, the very largest institutions may reasonably think of themselves as too big to fail and unwind. In this case, they should resist standards tough enough to preclude them from pursuing heavy tail risks that extract government-contributed capital from the safety net.
Neither Basel II nor U.S. regulatory protocols include specific plans for resolving large multinational financial organizations. The obvious opportunities for risk-shifting that this gap in planning poses leads me to infer that the nation's largest banks do not want a benchmark cross-country resolution protocol to be designed and tested. As a group, they may 1 Of course, the New York Congressional Delegation was expected to weigh in on the side of the large banks.
However, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank was quoted in a February 20, 2007
American Banker column on "Washington People" as saying: "My basic concern [about the Basel process] is that I have to pay attention to it and it gives me a headache. It's Rubik's cube -every time you do one thing, six other people get upset."
believe that an unstructured environment would enhance their ability to lobby for forbearances and/or to negotiate away their assessment exposure if a large bank were actually to become insolvent. This hypothesis can explain why large U.S. institutions continue to lobby uniformly for further capital relief.
At each agency, the vast majority of employees are involved in supervising and servicing their clienteles. These operations create a bureaucratic interest in preserving the size and competitive positions of the sector they regulate. At the same time, no member of the FDIC+ community would like to test the system's ability to resolve the insolvency of a giant firm. For both reasons, these agencies are bound to oppose adjustments that promise to increase the probability that a large institution might become economically insolvent.
Policymakers agreed at the outset that their goal was to improve risk management at large banks, not to help banks to operate with markedly lower levels of capital. In the predeal phase, U.S. regulators agreed publicly that very large U.S. banks 2 would be required to use whatever version of the Advanced IRB approach (AIRB us ) regulators finally authorize. Other U.S. institutions could choose, but only between the AIRB us and a Standardized approach.
The second part of the understanding among regulators was that the overall level of U.S. bank capital would not be allowed to decrease much under Basel II. "Much" is of course a word that could be interpreted differently by different constituencies. Behind this understanding lay regulators' statutory duty under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 to define a series of simple leverage-ratio triggers (measured by capital to total assets) for Prompt Corrective action (PCA) intervention that are tough enough and transparent enough to make authorities accountable ex post for losses suffered by the federal insurance fund. FDICIA designates an unweighted leverage ratio of two percent as the threshold at which an undercapitalized bank that does not promptly recapitalize itself must surrender its charter. However, the numerical value or accounting tripwires that require lesser interventions are set by interagency agreement.
Perhaps because they fear that PCA requirements impinge on Fed independence, Federal Reserve personnel have often mischaracterized regulatory concern for the leverage ratio as a mere transitional safeguard meant to "backstop" Basel protocols for banks whose information or control systems might initially mishandle the complicated AIRB capital calibration. However, Congress and the FDIC+ recognize that the greater simplicity and transparency of a troubled bank's leverage ratio create the personal and bureaucratic accountability that ultimately enables PCA requirements to restrain capital forbearance.
PCA obligations and the second understanding undermined predeal assurances that led the banking industry to expect that individual banks that designed and operated state-of-theart risk-management systems would be rewarded with reduced levels of regulatory capital. In an offhand effort to sort out the conflict in understandings, one Fed Governor -Governor Susan Schmidt Bies -was quoted as saying, "The leverage ratio down the road has got to disappear." 3 This was good news for large institutions, because the disappearance of leverageratio triggers is a development they favor.
However, the length of this road was noticeably extended by the outcome of the fourth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4). As Figure 2 shows, QIS4 indicated that if the 26 bank holding companies surveyed met only AIRB-generated requirements, 17 of them would show a leverage ratio that PCA standards would classify as undercapitalized.
This result was both surprising and disturbing. It was surprising in that it seems as if the quantitative staffs at these 17 giant holding companies used QIS4 survey instruments to demonstrate to their superiors how effectively Basel II would let them arbitrage restrictions on leverage without stopping to appreciate the parallel danger of demonstrating this same capacity to regulators in other industry segments. The outcome was disturbing in two ways. To counter accountability resistance, it is important to keep tough and transparent leverage-ratio thresholds as the key to identifying failing and zombie firms. It is equally important to continue to give these thresholds incentive force by mandating that every agency's Inspector General conduct a thorough "material loss review" whenever an institution it supervises imposes a substantial loss on the insurance fund. A conscientious material loss 4 If true, the fault lies either in the procedures used to validate IRB models in particular countries or in the absence of PCA requirements from Basel II (Nieto and Wall, 2006) . Ironically European banks routinely express the opposite fear: that regulatory foot-dragging generates advantages for U.S. banks. They also complain that post-Basel negotiations within the EU have made little progress in narrowing home-host divergences. 5 Paletta (2007) Taylor (2007) notes that accountability resistance can explain why IRB approaches are being embraced in countries whose banks and regulators lack both the data and human capital to use an IRB model prudently. It is important to recognize that protocols adopted in financial-center countries may be emulated slavishly in other environments. This is why it is important for US authorities to avoid loose ends and why they must not cede control of the inevitably politicized capital-assessment process to bank quants in the hope that, in the nottoo-distant future, transparent and reliable statistical methods for objectively measuring risk exposure will emerge.
At strongly capitalized banks, it might seem defensible to measure risk exclusively by IRB procedures if the Basel approach to risk-weighting could be made truly comprehensive.
However, measuring bank risk comprehensively is not the role that the leverage ratio plays in PCA. The simpler tests embodied in PCA thresholds are designed to trigger accountable endgame regulatory discipline. Because they are complicated, Basel protocols will always contain loopholes that facilitate regulatory forbearance. It is no accident that Pillar I neglects exposures to interest-rate risk in its banking book and numerous concealment options created by the complexity of a bank's balance sheet. Hence, even if regulators could appropriately measure all of a bank's loss exposures, it would still be wise to develop clauses that confront nontransparencies in the forbearance pressures that regulators in individual countries might experience.
Whatever protocols US regulators finally approve for risk weighting, they ought also incorporate market-value losses into their operative definition of institutional capital.
Consistent with evidence presented by Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) , leverage-ratio supervisory triggers would be improved if accountants were required to define contra-asset loan-loss reserves as the higher of either: (1) incentive-conflicted estimates now routinely prepared by bank personnel or (2) estimates generated by a rolling-regression model that agency researchers would be asked to develop and update each quarter. 
